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“Know the enemy, and know yourself, and in a
hundred battles you will never be in peril” [5].
These prophetic words, spokenover 2,500 years ago byrenowned Chinese general SunTzu, ring true for the battlefieldwarrior and information security
administrator alike. Knowing the enemy faced
by information security is a vital component to
shaping an information security defense pos-
ture. The press routinely publishes dramatic
reports of billions of dollars lost to computer
theft, fraud, and abuse. The 2002 Computer
Security Institute/Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (CSI/FBI) survey on Computer Crime and
Security Survey found that 90% of respondents
(primarily large corporations and government
agencies) detected computer security breaches
within the last 12 months. The report docu-
mented that 80% of respondents acknowledged
financial losses due to computer breaches, a
total of approximately $455,848,000 in finan-
cial losses, up from $377,828,700 reported in
2001. Respondents citing their Internet connec-
tions as a frequent point of attack rose from
70% in 2001 to 74% in 2002 [3].
Security researchers warn: “Information
security continues to be ignored by top man-
agers, middle managers, and employees alike.
The result of this neglect is that organizational
systems are far less secure than they might oth-
erwise be and that security breaches are far
more frequent and damaging than is necessary”
[4]. In order to strengthen the level of protec-
tion of information in the organization, those
responsible for that information must begin
with an understanding of the threats facing the
information, and then must examine the vul-
nerabilities inherent in the systems that store,
process, and transmit the information possibly
subjected to those threats. The first part of this
strategy is the identification of the dominant
threats facing organizational information secu-
rity, and the ranking of those threats in order 
to allow organizations to direct priorities
accordingly.
Sadly, IT executives have frequently identi-
fied the security of information as an important
but not critical issue [4]. IT executives report-
edly dropped information security as an impor-
tant issue altogether in 1995, suggesting either
they felt they had sufficiently addressed the
problem, or they no longer felt it was as signif-
icant as other issues [1]. 
A firm can build more effective 
security strategies by identifying and
ranking the severity of potential 
threats to its IS efforts.  
ENEMY AT THE GATE: THREATS TO
INFORMATION SECURITY
By Michael E. Whitman
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Profiling the Enemy
Changes in the identification of threats, in the roll-
out of new technologies, and the identification of
new threats may have dramatically shifted the orga-
nizational security focus. In an attempt to better
understand the threats facing organizations, this
study examined three questions: What are the threats
to information security? Which of these threats are the
most serious? How frequently (per month) are these
threats observed?
In order to identify the threats
to be assessed, the study identi-
fied a dozen categories of threats
by examining previous works
and publications and by inter-
viewing three chief information
security officers. These cate-
gories are:
1. Act of Human Error or
Failure (accidents,
employee mistakes)
2. Compromises to Intellec-
tual Property (piracy, copyright infringement)
3. Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass
(unauthorized access and/or data collection) 
4. Deliberate Acts of Information Extortion
(blackmail of information disclosure) 
5. Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
(destruction of systems or information) 
6. Deliberate Acts of Theft (illegal confiscation of
equipment or information) 
7. Deliberate Software Attacks
(viruses, worms, macros,
denial of service) 
8. Forces of Nature (fire, flood,
earthquake, lightning) 
9. Quality of Service Devia-
tions from Service Providers
(power and WAN service
issues)
10. Technical Hardware Failures
or Errors (equipment failure)
11. Technical Software Failures
or Errors (bugs, code prob-
lems, unknown loopholes) 
12. Technological Obsolescence (antiquated or out-
dated technologies) 
The next step was to develop an online survey ask-
ing IT executives to rank the threats to information
security; to identify the priority of expenditures to
protect against these threats; and to indicate the fre-
quency of attacks attributed to each category. 
As expected, the respondents were predominantly
IS directors, managers, or supervisors (see Figure 1).
They represented a variety of organizational sizes, the
majority of which were greater than 1,000 employees
(see Figure 2). 
When asked how their company uses the Internet,
almost 95% responded they use it Internet to provide
information; 81% use it to collect information; 60%
to advertise; 55% to provide customer service; 46%
to support internal operations; 45% to order goods
and services; 38% to pro-
vide technical support;
36% to connect remote
sites; 32% to extend inter-
nal networks; 27% to inte-
grate value chain partners;
and 18% to collect orders.
With the extensive use
of the Internet (99%),
these organizations could
clearly be open to attack.
With almost 95% of
respondents providing
information via the Internet,
there could be a great expo-
sure of information to poten-
tial crime, abuse, or misuse. With almost half of
respondents indicating use of the Internet to support
internal operations, there is also the risk of unautho-
rized disclosure or modification of information.
What are organizations doing to protect them-
selves? As indicated in
Table 1, all respondents
use passwords and virtu-
ally all use media back-
ups and virus protection.
What is not revealed is
the organizations’ vigi-
lance in updating virus
definitions, or the type of
media backup schedule,
either of which could
negate any benefit
derived from use of these
protection mechanisms. 
Sadly, only about 63%
indicated a consistent
security policy. The secu-
rity policy is the first and
potentially most important layer of security available
to an organization. Security policies define the secu-
rity philosophy and posture the organization takes,
and are the basis for all subsequent security decisions
and implementations. Again, what’s indistinguishable
Technology VPs
(Corporate Mgmt)
8%
IS/IT Staff
6%
IS/IT directors,
managers or
supervisors
62%
Executive IS
managers (CIOs,
CTO, or Exec VP)
24%
Figure 1. Respondents by
position.
101–500
28%
<100
6%
1001–2500
17%
2501–5000
8%
>5000
21%
501–1000
20%
Figure 2. Respondents by 
organizational size.
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is the effectiveness, compre-
hensiveness, and quality of
the security policies of those
indicating the presence of a
policy. Equally concerning is
the low response in the area
of ethics training. A funda-
mental part of an organiza-
tion’s security function is the
implementation of a security
education, training, and
awareness (SETA) program.
Both the security policy and
the SETA program are rela-
tively low-cost protection
mechanisms with the poten-
tial for high returns-on-
investment. As technologists
we often overlook the human
solutions and instead opt for
technology solutions, when
in fact the human factors
must be addressed first, with technology assisting in
the enforcement of desired human behaviors. 
Know the Enemy
The key information sought in this study is the iden-
tification and ranking of threats to information secu-
rity. This list presents the result of the study with
each category’s corresponding ranking.
Threat Category Weighted
Ranking
Deliberate Software Attacks 2178
Technical Software Failures or Errors 1130
Act of Human Error or Failure 1101
Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass    1044 
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism    963
Technical Hardware Failures or Errors 942
Deliberate Acts of Theft 695
Forces of Nature 611
Compromises to Intellectual Property 495
QoS Deviations from Service Providers 434
Technological Obsolescence 428
Deliberate Acts of Information Extortion     225
The ranking is a calculation based on a combina-
tion of the respondents evaluating each category on a
scale of “very significant” to “not significant” and then
identifying the top five threats to their organization.
With the prevalence of the malicious code attacks, it
is not surprising that Deliberate Software Attacks tops
the list, weighted almost twice as important as the sec-
ond threat on the list. Given the cases of Nimda,
Code Red, Sircam, Klez, and
the SQL Slammer Worm,
there is a substantial risk to
organizational information
and systems from malicious
code. What is their primary
means of access to systems?
Exploitation of human fail-
ures in accidental activation
of virus and worm executa-
bles, usually from email or
Web site downloads. What’s
also interesting is that threats
of Technical Software Failure
or Errors ranked second,
which can be viewed as both
a threat and vulnerability; as
malicious code and intruders
exploiting problems in the
software code. A direct threat
to information exists when
software failure causes infor-
mation to be inaccurate,
compromises integrity, or
simply corrupts or impedes
availability. Third and fourth
on the list are Acts of Human Error or Failure and
Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass, better
known as hacking. 
These results were compared to the 2002 CSI/FBI
Annual Computer Crime and Security Survey [3],
which ranked the following items as significant threats
(in order of significance) with 2001 ranking in paren-
theses:
1. Virus (1)
2. Insider abuse of Net access (2)
3. Laptop (3)
4. Denial of Service (6) 
5. Unauthorized access by insiders (4)
6. System penetration (5)
7. Theft of proprietary info (7)
8. Financial fraud (9)
9. Telecom fraud (10)
10. Sabotage (8)
11. Telecom eavesdropping (11)
12. Active wiretap (12)
Both studies found malicious code the number-one
threat. Not surprising, the CSI/FBI study found it the
dominating threat for the past several years. The sec-
ond threat category in the CSI/FBI study was Insider
abuse of Net access. Interestingly enough this is more
a function of security policy, ethics training, and
Table 1. Threat protection
mechanisms employed in
respondents’ organizations. 
Protection Mechanisms
Use of passwords
Media backup
Virus protection software 
Employee education
Audit procedures
Consistent security policy
Firewall
Encourage violations reporting
Auto account logoff
Monitor computer usage
Publish formal standards
Control of workstations
Network intrusion detection
Host intrusion detection 
Ethics training
No outside dialup connections
Use shrink-wrap software only
No internal Internet connections
Use internally developed software only
No outside network connections
No outside Web connections
100%
97.9%
97.9%
89.6%
65.6%
62.5%
61.5%
51.0%
50.0%
45.8%
43.8%
40.6%
33.3%
31.3%
30.2%
10.4%
9.4%
6.3%
4.2%
4.2%
2.1%
(Multiple responses possible)
human failure than of technology. In order for a
response to qualify for this category, first an organiza-
tion had to establish a security policy, then train the
employees on what they could and could not use their
Internet access for, then the individuals had to fail to
follow the established policy. Whether those respond-
ing to this question actually met all three require-
ments is open to speculation. Similar in scope is the
CSI/FBI’s unauthorized access by insiders. Here,
however, there may be technology issues present. Was
this a failure of individuals to follow policy? Or was it
the failure or absence of a control
mechanism to regulate user
access?
The next area of interest was
the frequency of attacks identi-
fied by respondents. Unfortu-
nately, for every attack detected
many more go undetected. Table
2 presents the responses to the
inquiries on the number of
attacks per month. Of particular
interest is the emergence of
Deliberate Acts of Information
Extortion, the intentional illegal
acquisition of information from
an organization, with the intent
to blackmail the organization
with the threat of publication,
dissemination, or use. While not
a largely indicated threat, the
mere presence designates an
increase in the malicious nature
of intruders. In general, almost
all of the respondents indicated
some form of attack, whether internal or external.
As is evident from the findings, the threat is real,
the stakes are high, and the systems protecting the tar-
get information are difficult to protect. Just as Loch,
Carr, and Warkentin found in a similar study over 10
years ago, “results suggest that management needs to
(1) become more informed of the potential for secu-
rity breaches … (2) increase their awareness in key
areas, … and (3) recognize that their overall level of
concern for security may underestimate the potential
risk inherent in the highly connected environment in
which they operate” [2]. 
How to Put this Information to Use
Now that an organization knows what the threats are,
how can its security administrators and technology
managers put this information to use? One of the
most direct uses of this information is in the identifi-
cation and application of controls. The methodology
to develop and implement a “control matrix” is sim-
ple. Making it work is the real challenge.
Identify and prioritize threats to the organization’s
information assets. Beginning with the information
provided, the security administrators should prioritize
those categories of threats that represent the greatest
danger to the organization. How the organization
defines danger is up to them. Danger could be deter-
mined based on the probability of an attack coupled
with the potential loss value in financial terms, in crit-
ical information, or in potential embarrassment. The
criteria used to rank the threats are part of the cus-
tomization of the process to the organization’s needs.
Identify and prioritize the information assets.
Administrators should detail all assets that collect,
process, store, or use information in the organization.
These will most likely not be all IT assets, and should
include various “people” areas as well. How the orga-
nization prioritizes these assets could be based on the
number or severity of known vulnerabilities, exposure
to threats, cost or difficulty of replacement of the asset,
content of critical information, or a host of other cri-
teria. Should more than one criterion be used in eval-
uating the asset, a weighted means could be developed
to quantify the ranking.
Create a matrix listing the threats, in priority, along
one axis, and the assets, in priority along the other.
The resulting grid provides a convenient method of
examining the “exposure” of assets, allowing a sim-
plistic vulnerability assessment. Table 3 presents a
sample of the resulting framework.
Fill in each intersection with the current controls.
The intersection of the threat to asset pair represents
an area that should be addressed by more than one
control. Controls in this situation are defined as those
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Number of Attacks per Month
Average Responses:
>100
 Act of Human Error or Failure
Compromises to Intellectual Property
Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass
Deliberate Acts of Information Extortion
Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
Deliberate Acts of Theft
Deliberate Software Attacks
Forces of Nature
Quality of Service Deviations from 
Service Providers
Technical Hardware Failures or Errors
Technical Software Failures or Errors
Technological Obsolescence
1. 
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
5.2%
1.0%
4.2%
1.0%
11.5%
1.0%
4.0%
51–100
2.1%
2.1%
3.1%
9.4%
1.0%
3.1%
5.2%
1.0%
3.4%
10–50
14.6%
3.1%
3.1%
1.0%
3.1%
7.3%
14.6%
2.1%
8.3%
11.5%
18.8%
15.6%
8.6%
< 10
41.7%
25.0%
20.8%
8.3%
31.3%
38.5%
47.9%
34.4%
43.8%
51.0%
45.8%
21.9%
34.2%
None
24.0%
61.5%
68.8%
90.6%
64.6%
54.2%
16.7%
62.5%
46.9%
34.4%
30.2%
60.4%
51.2%
No
Answer
12.5%
7.3%
1.0%
6.9%
10.
11.
12.
Table 2. Numbers 
of attacks per month
as reported by
respondents.
measures that protect this asset from this threat, or
allow the organization to recover this asset if attacked
by this threat. If a particular asset is not at risk from a
paired threat, simply cross out that cell. At a mini-
mum each threat:asset pair should contain one policy-
related control, one education- and training-related
control, and one technology-related control. When all
controls in place have been entered, an organization
can (beginning with the upper-left corner of the
matrix) begin prioritizing the implementation of
additional controls until such time as multiple con-
trols have been assigned, implemented, and tested to
protect each asset.
Upon completion of this task, not only have the
administrators gone through an internal self-assess-
ment of vulnerabilities, they also have ensured the
organization has “defense in depth” providing protec-
tion and recovery capabilities for all priority informa-
tion assets.
Policy and the SETA Program
The information gathered through the aforemen-
tioned exercise should not be used in isolation. Nor
should it be the first exercise in security profile devel-
opment. Security advocates emphasize that any secu-
rity profile begins with valid security policy [4, 6]. This
policy is then translated into action through an effec-
tive security plan focusing on the prevention, detec-
tion, and correction of threats. While the development
of such a policy—or more accurately, series of poli-
cies—is so important as to go beyond the scope of this
discussion, it is vital an organization begin with the
methodical development of such policy. 
An additional activity that should be developed early
is the design and implementation of an employee secu-
rity education, training, and aware-
ness program. These programs seek
to educate employees on the
importance of security, and its
implementation within the organi-
zation. The accompanying aware-
ness program seeks to keep security
on the minds of employees as they
deal with vital information on a
daily basis. 
Lessons Learned
The lessons learned from this
study are simple. Now, more
than ever before, the information
contained in the organization is
at risk. There are a large number of threats to this
information, representing diverse and complex chal-
lenges to protect the information, personnel, and
systems that process, transport, and store it. This
requires a wide array of protection mechanisms and
strategies to be thorough. An important component
of this protection is the understanding of the enemy. 
This study sought to provide additional insight into
this understanding, as well as a method for assessing
protection mechanisms, ensuring a comprehensive
security profile, with defense in depth. Organizations
that employ these techniques can expect to better
understand their security profile, and more easily iden-
tify weaknesses in it. This information, coupled with
solid policy planning, and SETA development should
allow an organization to better focus its security efforts,
thus increasing its probability of protecting the infor-
mation and reducing its vulnerability to attack.  
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Asset 1 Asset 2 ... ... ... ... ... ... Asset n
Threat 1
Threat 2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Threat n
These bands of controls should be continued through all threat: asset pairs.
Priority of
Controls
1
...... ...
2 3 4 5 6
Table 3. Sample control matrix 
(incomplete).
